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Power Plant Siting on Public Lands: A
Proposal for Resolving the EnvironmentalDevelopmental Conflict
By LEE KAPALOSKI*
INTRODUCTION

There is perhaps nothing in the energy development arena
more frustrating, complex, or misunderstood than the mystical
process of energy facility siting on federal or public lands. Endless wasted hours of second-guessing, sidestepping and outrageous amounts of bureaucratic paperwork are the notorious
hallmark of siting today.
This paper does not claim to be a panacea to this dilemma.
However, the procedures proposed do have real potential for
making the siting process at least comprehensible and, more
important, efficient for both the private industrial applicants
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
Simply stated, this article presents' a straight-forward
practical methodology for finding the best sites for energy development on public lands. Further, the procedures suggested
are aimed at minimizing the lost time, manpower, and money
inherent in the currently used siting process-a system which
is realistically ad hoc at best.
The resulting proposal is organized into two separately
considered but clearly overlapping concerns, the legal rationale
and the technical methodology. The legal rationale sets out an
argument that the BLM has a statutory duty to develop some
process for siting large energy developments. The technical
methodology section follows with a suggested solution for meeting that responsibility.
* B.S., 1967, University of Utah; B.S., 1968, University of Utah; M.A., 1972 San
Diego State University; Ph.D., 1978, University of Colorado; J.D., 1978, University of
Utah. The author is in private law practice and is a planning consultant in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
1. This article is a condensation of the author's doctoral dissertation, A Geo-Legal
Methodology for ConsideringEnvironmental Values in Siting of Energy Development
on PublicLands (available through the University of Michigan Microfilm Library, Ann
Arbor). The research for the dissertation was supported by the grant of the National
Environmental Conservation Fellowship, granted by the National Wildlife Federation.
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LEGAL RATIONALE

FLPMA & the BLM
With the passage of the Federal Land Policy and Manage-

ment Act 2 (FLPMA) in 1976, over one-third of the total land

area of the United States was put under the administration of
the BLM and became subject to dramatically expanded land
use planning and management mandates. Beneath, upon, and
above these public lands are a vast and varied array of resource
values, both developmental and environmental, which the
BLM must manage in a manner that on one hand, "recognizes
the Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber from the public lands

. . ."I

and, on the other

hand, "will protect the quality or scientific, scenic, historical,
ecological, environmental, and atmospheric water resources,
and archaeological values."'
The BLM must develop some management process which
fulfills these two supposedly coequal goals in a fashion wherein
"the national interest will be best realized."5 While any definition of the term, "national interest," is tenuous, the Public
Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) has developed the
phrase "maximization of net public benefits."6 Inherent in the
goal dichotomy are conflicts where the unrestrained maximizing of a developmental objective will seldom if ever be entirely
compatible with the maximizing of the environmental goal.
This inherent conflict of resource values imposes upon the
BLM as part of its decisionmaking the responsibility to make
the necessary sacrifices favoring one type of value over another.
In order to satisfy the responsibility of maximizing net
social benefits, the procedures of conflict resolution in siting
2. BLM Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2773 (codified at 43 U.S.C.A.
§§§ 1701-1782 and in scattered sections of 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 48, 49 U.S.C.A.
(Supp. 1978)) [hereinafter referred to as the FLPMA].
3. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(12) (Supp. 1978).
4. Id. §1701(a)(8).
5. Id. §1701(a)(12).
6. U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND
46 (1970). [Hereinafter referred to as PLLRC or PLLRC REPoiR] The Commission
developed the definition in response to its own mandate that "the public lands . . .
shall be (a) retained and managed or (b) disposed of all in a manner to provide the
maximum benefit for the general public." 43 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970). As stated in one of
the Commission's reports, there was clear recognition that the net maximization would
include both developmental and environmental goals. P. HAGENSTIN, CmRrFslA FOR
PUBLIC LAND DEcIsioNs 10-15 (1970).
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must be applied systematically and, perhaps more importantly, they must be timely relative to the realities of the utility industry's planning and constraints. The procedure must be
one which forces the BLM to affirmatively identify potential
zones for siting energy development prior to any significant
commitment by a utility to a specific site. Intrinsic in the present posture of the BLM is the politically sensitive burden of
challenging as respondent any industrially identified site which
may not be of the best "net public benefit." This political
burden often calcifies the agency's willingness to assert the
necessary value trade-off resolutions in favor of the industry's
predispositions, thus compromising certain very important
public resource values. This section of the paper develops the
argument that under both the Constitution and the FLPMA,
the BLM is compelled to develop a siting process which, among
other things, requires the BLM in cooperation with state and
local governments to nominate or prequalify areas or zones for
energy conversion facility siting prior to any formal applications from utilities.
B. ConstitutionalBasis
The generic governmental authority relative to managing
federally owned public lands comes from the broad powers contained in the Property Clause of the Constitution which allows
Congress to do essentially all that it feels is necessary to properly manage and protect these lands.7 The scope of this power
has been historically expanded by the courts8 to the point of
recent declarations by the Supreme Court in Kleppe v. New
Mexico.9 In Kleppe the power delegated to the Secretary of
Interior to manage wild burros was challenged. 9 The central
issue was "whether Congress exceeded its power under the
Constitution in enacting the Wild Free Roaming Horses and
Burros Act."" The Court, in its interpretation of the scope of
power under the Property Clause, directly discounted any
claims of limited powers on federal lands."
This grant of almost unbridled congressional discretion is
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl. 2.
8. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
9. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
10. Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C. §§1331-1340
(1976).
11. 426 U.S. at 531.
12. Id. at 539.
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illustrated by the early statement of the Supreme Court that
"it is not for the courts to say how that trust [in public lands]3
shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine."'
More explicitly, in a case about federal jurisdiction over the
Hetchly Dam in the Yosemite National Park area, the Court
indicates that Congress has plenary power over public property
entrusted to it." More directly related to the power to determine the distribution and allocation of uses on public lands,
the Court in Kleppe cites an earlier statement that Congress
has the power to control land use and to condition rights in
5
land.
Given these cases, there seems to be ample authority for
Congress to authorize by statute the imposition of rules and
regulations necessary to carry out public policies on public
land. Congress' delegation of authority to the Secretary of Interior, then, would seem to be limited primarily by the restrictions Congress imposed in the statutory grant of the FLPMA.
In addition to these Property Clause powers, there are
other constitutional powers held by Congress, as trustee for the
public lands, which strengthen the legal rationale for delegating powers to develop an affirmative siting process. In sum, the
public trust doctrine is based upon the recognition of the government as the trustee of certain natural resources with the
responsibility to manage the trust for the benefit of all the
people.'" Coupling this trust responsibility with the Property
Clause, it is argued here that Congress not only can take positive steps to manage the public lands, but must, as trustee,
take such steps to protect the public interest in these lands."
The Supreme Court clearly states this duty is an affirmative
responsibility rather than merely a power to be used at the
discretion of Congress.' 8 Therefore, Congress, with trustee re13. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911).
14. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940).
15. Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917).
16. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
17. Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment,
1970 UTAH L. REV. 388 (1970).
18.
The United States holds resources and territory in trust for its citizens in one sense, but not in the sense that a private trustee holds for a
cestui que trust. The responsibility of Congress is to utilize the assets that
come into its hands as sovereign in a way that it decides what is best for
the future of the nation.
Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1954).
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sponsibility for the BLM administered public lands, is obligated to create a mechanism for protecting present and future
public interests in the land against obtrusive interference by
private parties.'9
C. Delegation to the BLM
It is a generally accepted principle of administrative law
that, absent some inherent constitutional power of office, all
federal administrative authority must be conferred by statute,
either explicitly or implicitly. 0 The most comprehensive direct
delegation of authority to the BLM is contained in the
FLPMA. Although the Supreme Court almost universally allows limitless delegation, it is necessary as a prerequisite to
later arguments favoring mandatory siting requirements to
identify historic delegations by Congress which transfer the
above-mentioned congressional trustee responsibilities to the
Secretary of Interior.'
The first congressional assignment of any true management or planning authority over the public lands to the executive branch occurred as a result of the Taylor Grazing Act of
1935. Prior to that period, all the lands outside the congressionally specified reserve lands were held for ultimate disposal.2
Prior to and throughout this period "supervision of public business relating to . . . public lands, including mines was the
general duty of the Secretary of Interior. ' ' 23 Before 1946 the
19. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
20. See generally, W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (5th ed. 1970)
ch. 2, §1 [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN & BYSE].
21. The instant question is not whether the BLM's delegated authority was too
broad or invalid but whether the delegation is clear enough to support the argument
that Congress intended to require the BLM to develop for the public lands a land
management mechanism which insures adequate protection of the public trust in that
land. This statement relies upon the conclusion of GELLHORN & BYSE that the court
has only twice limited congressional delegations. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
22. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAND LAW, ch. 21 (1968); Muys, The Federal
Lands, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 493 (1974).
23. 43 U.S.C. §1457 (1970). This general delegation of authority was apppoved by
the Supreme Court when it determined:
By general statutory provisions the execution of the laws regulating
the acquision of rights in public lands and the general care of these lands
is confided to the land department, as a special tribunal; and the Secretary of Interior, as head of the department, is charged with seeing that
this authority is rightly exercised to the end that . . . the rights of the
public [be] preserved.
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459 (1920) (emphasis added).
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General Land Office was the agency under the Secretary for
administering all public lands not statutorily transferred to
some preserve or reserve status such as the national forests and
the national parks.2 1 It was in 1946 that the BLM was formally
established by a reorganization plan issued by President Tru-

man

25

Later, in a 1950 executive order, the land management
powers of the Secretary were more specifically stated.26 However, between the Taylor Grazing Act and the FLPMA, land
management was still based on the assumption that the lands
would eventually be disposed? 7 There was no clear guidance to
the BLM as to how it was to manage the lands beyond promotion of grazing and mineral extraction until the passage of the
Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964.2 This Act required
the Secretary to recommend which federally reserved lands
should be retained and which if any should be disposed. 29
In the period betwen 1964 and 1969 the PLLRC was to
make its recommendations about the disposition of public
lands.10 The final report of the Commission recommended a
dramatic shift in attitude away from favoring disposal to a
24. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, §403, 60 Stat. 1097 (1946).
25. Id.
26. There are hereby transferred to the Secretary of Interior all functions of all other officers of the Department of Interior and all functions
of all agencies and employees of such Department . . . . The Secretary
of Interior may from time to time make such provisions as he [deems)
appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, or by any
agency . . . of any function of the Secretary.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, §§1-2, 43 U.S.C. 1451 (1970).
27. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, §1, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934).
28. 43 U.S.C. §1411 (1970).
29. The Secretary of Interior . . . will determine which of the public
lands . . . shall be (a) disposed of because they are (1) required for the
orderly growth and development of a community or (2) are chiefly valuable for residential, commercial, agricultural (exclusive of lands chiefly
valuable for grazing and raising forage crops), industrial, or public uses
or development or (b) retained, at least during this period in Federal
ownership and managed for (1) domestic livestock grazing, (2) fish and
wildlife development and utilization, (3) industrial development, (4)
mineral production, (5) occupancy, (6) outdoor recreation, (7) timber
production, (8) watershed protection, (9) wilderness preservation or (10)
preservation of public values that would be lost if the land passed from
Federal ownership.
Id. at §1411(a).
30. 43 U.S.C. §1391 (1970).
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comprehensive retention policy.3 ' In addition, the Commission
foresaw the vital necessity of comprehensive land planning by
recommending that "[all public land agencies should be required to formulate long range, comprehensive land use plans
was not until the passage of the FLPMA in 1976
. .. .,It
that the BLM finally had direct statutory mandates for this
recommended planning process.3 The shift in policy toward
retention is a crucial prerequisite to applying the public trust
doctrine to the BLM lands.
In summary, it appears that Congress has explicitly delegated to the Secretary of Interior and the BLM certain powers
and responsibilities which Congress constitutionally held over
lands retained in trust for the public.
D. BLM Exercise of Power
For analysis, the duties of the Secretary via the BLM and
the FLPMA are here divided into two classes. The first class is
the policy duties to which the BLM must adhere. The second
is the process duties which are the specific procedures which
the BLM must use to achieve these policies.
The basic policy mandates relevant to planning and management are contained in the Declaration of Policy title of the
FLPMA.3 4 This title contains three requirements imposing certain policy constraints on the actual planning process to be
used by the BLM for managing the lands. While there is no
explicit precedence among these mandates, by implication one
seems to be the framework for achieving the others. This is the
one requiring the implementation of the multiple use and sus31. PLLRC REPorr 1 (1970).
32. Id. at 52.
33. The FLPMA specified the Secretarial powers:
Subject to the discretion granted to him by Reorganization Plan
Number 3 of 1950, the Secretary shall carry out through the Bureau [of
Land Management) all functions, powers, and duties vested in him...
through the Bureau of Land Management ....
43 U.S.C.A. §1731(b) (Supp. 1978). Further, Congress endorsed land retention when
it declared that "the public lands be retained in Federal ownership." Id. §1701(b).
In the original Senate version, the retention philosophy was more explicit.
"[Tihe national interest will be best served by retaining the natural resource lands
in Federal ownership." S. 507, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. §3(a)(4) (1975). See also, letter
from Jack Horton, Assistant Secretary of Interior, to Senator Henry Jackson (March
6, 1975) in Hearings on S. 507 Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Land
Resources, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1975), for a similar endorsement of this policy.
34. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701 (Supp. 1978).
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tained yield principles as the basis for management." ' Within
the framework of the multiple use and sustained yield principles, the actual land use planning and decisionmaking are to
be carried out in a manner which includes equal consideration
of the aforementioned environmental and developmental

goals .31
While the use of the multiple use and sustained yield
framework can be somewhat procedural, policy goals and duties are also contained in the definition of multiple use.3 As a
part of its duties as trustee, the multiple use principle directs
the BLM to manage the lands in a way which somehow
achieves the best combination of land uses over time. Referring
to the Declaration of Policy title again, the combination of a
necessity for legally established goals and objectives as guidelines for public land use planning with the requirement of multiple use as the basis for management can be interpreted to
mean simply that the statements in the multiple use definition
are to be the basic objectives of the management or land planning process.
The analytical limitation of these policy duties is the lack
of specific standards against which the actions of the BLM can
be judicially scrutinized. They are so broad and open-ended
that without more definitive statutory direction, any attempts
to force the BLM to take certain specific actions as a part of
35. Id. §1701(a)(7).
36. Id. §1701(a)(8), (9).
37. The term "multiple use" means the management of the public
lands and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the
American people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or
all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to provide
sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing
needs and conditions; the use of some land for less than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes
into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and
nonrenewable resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range,
timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historic values; and harmonious and coordinated management
of the various resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment with consideration
being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to
the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the
greatest unit output.
Id. § 1702(c). See generally, U.S. House Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Forests
of the House Committee on Agriculture, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See also, Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L.J. 787 (1973).
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these policies would be very tenuous. Therefore, this specificity
must come from the process duties mentioned above.
The process requirements of the FLPMA are of two general
types. One is the requirement of establishing an overall land
management or planning process. The second is the mandatory
rulemaking requirement which applies to all the BLM activities that are a part of "administering public land statutes and
exercising discretionary authority granted by them .... "3
The rules called for therein are commonly designated informal
rules contemplated under section 553 of the Administrative
Procedures Act.39
The problem is the extent of the BLM planning and land
use activities which must be included in the rulemaking requirement of the FLPMA. In addition to the general policy
mandate for rulemaking, 0 the Act imposes on the Secretary
two more rulemaking requirements." Support for the conclusions that a planning process is subject to the rulemaking requirements appears to come directly from these provisions.
The scope of rulemaking described in the policy section includes activities in which the Secretary is "exercising discretionary authority granted by [the public land statutes] ...."42
In the planning process itself, the Secretary is granted
discretionary authority to "issue mangement decisions to implement land use plans developed or revised under this section
...

."43 Therefore,

it seems evident that the land use planning

which develops into plans to be implemented by secretarial
management decisions are all on a continuum of the exercise
of discretion which is within the scope of the rulemaking requirements. To isolate only the culminating decisions from the
38. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(a)(5) (Supp. 1978).
39. The public property exemption from the rulemaking requirement in section
553(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedures Act is explicitly eliminated for all activities
and lands covered by the FLPMA. 47 U.S.C.A. §1740 (Supp. 1978). See Verkiul,
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VIRGINIA L. REv. 185 (1974). See also,
Model Review of Informal Rulemaking: Recommendation 74-4 of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 1975 DUKE L.J. 479 (1975).
40. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(a)(5) (Supp. 1978). See note 38 supra and accompanying
text.
41. These separate sections require the Secretary to "issue regulations necessary
to implement the provisions of this Act with respect to the management, use, and
protection of the public lands . . .[and] promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out the purposes of this Act." 43 U.S.C.A. §§1733, 1740 (Supp. 1977).
42. Id. §1701(a)(5).
43. Id. §1712(e).
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basic process on which the management decision is based is an
arbitrary division not consistent with the concept of the whole
decision process which actually occurs under this section.
Further statutory support for integrating planning and
specific decisionmaking comes from the statement that the
planning process is "necessary to implement the provisions
[for] the management, use, and protection of the public lands
.

.

.

.""

Most importantly, the FLPMA imposes an informa-

tional prerequisite to any allocation of uses, withdrawals, or
rights-of-way in the development of some land use plans for the
4
areas involved. 5
44. Id. §1733.
45. The following planning information is required for withdrawals of 5000 acres
or more and is to come from the planning for the affected area. Therefore, the 202
planning must occur prior to the formal withdrawal. The required planning information is:
(1) a clear explanation of the proposed use of the land involved
which led to the withdrawal;
(2) an inventory and evaluation of the current natural resource uses
and values of the site and adjacent public and nonpublic land and how
it appears they will be affected by the proposed use, including particularly aspects of use that might cause degradation of the environment, and
also the economic impact of the change in use on individuals, local communities, and the nation;
(3) an identification of present users of the land involved, and how
they will be affected by the proposed use;
(4) an analysis of the manner in which existing and potential resource uses are incompatible with or in conflict with the proposed use,
together with a statement of the provisions to be made for continuation
of termination of existing uses, including an economic analysis of such
continuation or termination;
(5) an analysis of the manner in which such lands will be used in
relation to the specific requirements for the proposed use;
(6) a statement as to whether any suitable alternative sites are
available (including cost estimates) for the proposed use or for uses such
as withdrawal would displace;
(7) a statement of the consultation which has been or will be had
with other Federal departments and agencies, with regional, State, and
local government bodies, and other appropriate individuals and groups;
(8) a statement indicating the effect of the proposed uses, if any,
on State and local government interests and the regional economy; •
(9) a statement of the expected length of time needed for the withdrawal;
(10) the time and place of hearings and of other public involvement
concerning such withdrawal;
(11) the place where the records on the withdrawal can be examined by interested parties; and
(12) a report prepared by a qualified mining engineer, engineering
geologist, or geologist which shall include but not be limited to informa-
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Given these prerequisites for any formal action involving
withdrawals or rights-of-way, which must of necessity be conditions precedent to action, the planning process, as the source
of such prerequisite information, is intimately tied to the decisions involved. The development of the information for the
planning process itself then is a part of the discretionary activities of the Secretary of Interior and the BLM. Therefore, it
should come within the scope of the rulemaking requirements.
The significance of the rulemaking procedures becoming a
requirement of the planning process is that they impose an
added responsibility on the agency to formally articulate the
decisionmaking framework inherent in the planning process
prior to any actual use of the process. Without such a rulemaking requirement, there is a significantly greater burden on the
agency when any legal challenge is made that the agency's
discretionary actions are not in compliance with the broad
statutory planning requirements. Without what Davis calls
"procedural principles"'" contained in written rules and regulation on: general geology, known mineral deposits, past and present mineral production, mining claims, mineral leases, evaluaion of future mineral potential, present and potential market demands.
Id. §1714(c)(2).
Each right-of-way shall contain(a) terms and conditions which will (i) carry out the purposes of this
Act and rules and regulations issued thereunder; (ii) minimize damage
to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise
protect the environment; (iii) require compliance with applicable air and
water quality standards established by or pursuant to applicable Federal
or State law; and (iv) require compliance with State standards for public
health and safety, environmental protection, and siting, construction,
operation, and maintenance of or for rights-of-way for similar purposes
if those standards are more stringent than applicable Federal standards;
and
(b) such terms and conditions as the Secretary concerned deems
necessary to (i) protect Federal property and economic interest; (ii)manage efficiently the lands which are subject to the right-of-way or adjacent
thereto and protect the other lawful users of the lands adjacent to or
traversed by such right-of-way; (iii) protect lives and property; (iv) protect the interests of individuals living in the general area traversed by the
right-of-way who rely on the fish, wildlife, and other biotic resources of
the area for subsistance purposes; (v) require location of the right-of-way
along a route that will cause least damage to the environment, taking into
consideration feasibility and other relevant factors; and (vi) otherwise
protect the public interest in the lands traversed by the right-of-way or
adjacent thereto.
Id. §1765(a), (b).

46. K.

DAVIS, ADMINImTRATIVE LAW TEXT

§4.07 (3rd ed. 1972). Professor Davis, an

authority of note on administrative law, feels very strongly that the potential for abuse
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tions to guide the exercise of administrative discretion, the
BLM very well could avoid certain specific responsibilities of
the FLPMA by claiming that specific responsibilities are undefined.
E. Siting Within the Language of the FLPMA
Siting is the process of allocating various combinations of
land uses to certain parcels of land for various periods of time.
The very act of allocating a use in most instances preempts
certain other potential land uses during the allocation time
period. If it can be shown that the FLPMA specifies certain
mandatory activities which are by the above definition siting
activities, it follows that there is a mandate to the BLM to
develop a siting process as a part of its overall management
responsibility of public lands.
The basis for all the BLM management decisions must be
the required adherence to the multiple use and sustained yield
principles." Throughout the definition of multiple use are requirements for land use allocation decisions between various
potential land uses. The primary thesis upon which the multiple use concept is built is that there is a necessity for some
institutional restriction of certain uses for certain parcels of
public land to protect the total public interest in that land.48
Implied in this thesis is the assumption that there is a greater
aggregate demand for resources than there is an adequate supply for any particular parcel of public lands.49 With a condition
of excessive demands, there is a strong possibility of resulting
overallocation or overuse of certain lands to the detriment of
the overall net public welfare unless there are some institutional constraints which insure that the use levels will not
"substantially impair the public interest in the lands." 0 The
of administrative discretion must be minimized mainly by rulemaking and not simply
statutory guidance. "The chief hope for confining discretionary power does not lie in
statutory enactments but in much more extensive administrative rulemaking." Id. at
94.
47. 43 U.S.C.A. §7101(a)(7) (Supp. 1978).
48. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33.
49. M. CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LNDs SINCE 1956, 10-21 (1967).
50. In the PLLRC's own study of the multiple use issue the institutional constraint on demand was recognized as a necessity.
The following three propositions give the basis of the multiple use
concept.
First, lands can and do produce many goods and services in many
circumstances they can be produced in various admixtures and combinations on a particular land area.

1979
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multiple use principles specified in the FLPMA as mandatory
guidance for the BLM require the agency decisionmaker to
make "the most judicious use of the land . . . [with] a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses. . .[in a manner
in which there may be a] use of some land for less than all the
resources .... "51
The act of limiting or specifying certain uses for particular
parcels of land is by its very nature an allocation process
wherein the spatial location of the use is a key factor. Allocating or locating that "combination [of uses] that will best meet
the present and future needs .., ." requires some type of comprehensive site analysis for all potential uses of the lands. The
FLPMA specifies what principles or major uses are to be sited
under multiple use. Under the multiple use concept are various
processes which the BLM must use, including land use planning 3 and the rights-of-way processes.Rights-of-way grants specifically include "systems for generation, transmission and distribution of energy."5 5 While these
are the main uses to be located on public lands, the multiple
use management principles applied to this location process
must equally take into account the "various resource values""
and other diverse resource uses such as "but not limited to...
watershed . . .and natural scenic, scientific and historic values." 57 In addition, while the limited list of "principal or major
uses" is separately defined, there is nowhere any statement in
Second, in many situations, total net benefits, however measured,
and not necessarily limited to dollar measurements, can be increased,
and perhaps maximized, through some judicious combination of two or
more uses on a particular area of land as compared to single use of the
land only.
Third, some harmonious and compatible combination of land uses,
with flexibility for change in the future and without significant impairment of the land, is desirable in the public interest.

K.

DAVIS,

E.

GOULD, JR.,

H.

NYGREN,

B.

WHALEY, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND LAWS AND

POLICIES RELATING TO MULTIPLE USE OF PUBLIC LANDS,
LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION 9

A

STUDY PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC

(1970).

51. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(c) (Supp. 1978).
52. Id.
53. Id. §§1711, 1712.
54. Id. §§1702(1), 1763, 1764, 1765.
55. Id. §1761(a)(4).
56. Id. §1702(c).
57. The statutory definition of multiple use equates value and use implying no
distinction in management. Id.
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the FLPMA which requires any distinguishing priority be assigned to them.
The BLM planning process called the Multiple Framework Planning (MFP) system is a beginning, but the integration of large scale rights-of-way applications and environmental analysis and planning is still far from being systematic. The
MFP concept does not focus significant attention on integrating large scale energy development questions which are a part
of the rights-of-way permit process into the MFP system. The
realities are that both the planning and the right-of-way processes are typically occurring concurrently and often unilaterally.
The serious problem with such separate and uncoordinated processes is the potential for right-of-way reviews to ignore or seriously discount the critical environmental values
required to be considered in the land planning. The situation
of inadequate planning to anticipate development plus a long
history of unilateral and very poorly coordinated processes further illustrates the vital necessity for a legally supported imposition upon the BLM to integrate the two processes in order to
adequately consider and protect the environmental values and
create a timely siting process. Fortunately, the FLPMA has
what appears to be more than adequate language to support
such an imposition via a rulemaking demand or mandamus
claim.18 In carrying out his responsibility of granting a right-ofway, the Secretary must identify and specify "terms and conditions which will . . . minimize damage to scenic and esthetic
58. "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. §1361 (1970). See generally,
Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of FederalAdministrative Action, 81 HAxv. L. Rv.
308 (1967). See also Udall v. Oil Shale Corp., 406 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 400 U.S. 48 (1970); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965);
Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (7th Cir. 1970).
The term ministerial is judicially defined as a duty positively commanded, plainly
defined and peremptory. See, e.g., Thomas v. Vinson, 153 F.2d 636, 638-39 (D.C. Cir.
1946). In certain courts the existence of the ministerial duty is prerequisite to any
further proceedings and if the duty is held not to be ministerial but discretionary, no
mandamus will issue. In other courts, an approach which appears much more rational
and realistic, is one which focuses on the administrator's scope of duty, ministerial or
discretionary, and bases the decision of mandamus issuance on whether there was
either an ignoring or exceeding of the duty. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Roughton
v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the
environment; . . .require compliance with applicable air and
water quality standards . . . , and require compliance with
State standards for . . . environmental protection, and siting

... ," In addition, the Secretary must identify and specify
those terms and conditions which he deems to be "necessary
to

. .

.require location of the right-of-way along a route that

will cause least damage to the environment, taking into consideration feasibility and other relevant factors .

. . ."0

The whole right-of-way section of the FLPMA is prefaced6
with the statement, "[ejach right-of-way shall contain," '
which explicitly imposes a requirement on the agency to come
up with the aforementioned terms and conditions prior to any
granting of a right-of-way. In addition, words such as "least"
and "minimal" are superlative terms which, if these areas
are to in fact be identified, require that all feasible areas must
be assessed. Otherwise, a secretarial conclusion that a particular right-of-way grant does indeed minimize damage will be
based on inadequate information and therefore be arbitrary.
Added to these statutory duties, the Secretary, in awarding
a right-of-way must specify the boundaries in such a way as
to insure the use "will do no unnecessary damage to the environment.""2 If the Secretary is to make a decision as to the
location of the right-of-way which he determines will do no
unnecessary damage, then all feasible rights-of-way (or sites)
must be considered.
Any attempt to plainly and specifically separate the planning duties of the BLM under the FLPMA into ministerial and
discretionary is unrealistic. In reality, the complex nature of
administering federal lands involves an inseparable mix of both
types of duties. Usually, the statutory commands include a
basis ministerial framework outlining broad policies and goals
under which certain degrees of administrative discretion can be
exercised in satisfying the ministerial framework requirements. 13 Using the mixed ministerial/discretionary approach,
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

43 U.S.C.A. §1765(a) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. §1765 (emphasis added).
Id. §1764(a)(4).
See GELLHORN & BYSE, 127-32 (5th ed. 1970); K. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §23.11 (1958). Specifically, one critic noted, "As a mode of analysis, the
ministerial-discretionary dichotomy is largely illusory because there are few federal

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

the issue is whether the Secretary's inaction or refusal to activate a preapplication right-of-way siting process is outside his
permissible scope of discretion. Concurrent with the consideration of his not developing or implementing a siting process is
the question of whether any issuance of a right-of-way permit
without the siting process existing exceeds the permissive scope
of discretion.
Throughout the cases which utilize this mixed ministerial/discretionary approach are phases setting the limit of
discretion by the use of terms such as action beyond a "rational
exercise of discretion," acts "beyond their discretion," and action "outside the scope" of discretionary authority, arguably
all synonymous with abuse of discretion." The issue is whether
Congress intended to allow the Secretary unbridled discretion
to grant rights-of-way which allow major facilities to be built
without a prerequisite comprehensive land planning process
being implemented. Given the above-mentioned statutory requirements of the FLPMA, there are strong arguments for
courts to compel the Secretary to carry out these requirements
for planning and siting rather than allow the Secretary to take
no action at all. In other words, purposeful inaction is felt by
some courts to be an "action" which is challengeable,15 particularly where complex environmental values are involved."
administrative determinations that do not involve an element of discretion and few
that are wholly discretionary." Byse & Fiocca, supra note 58 at 333.
64. See Davis v. Schultz, 453 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1971); Lovallo v. Resor, 443 F.2d
1262 (2d Cir. 1971); Casarino v. United States, 431 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1970); People v.
United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Feliciano v. Laird,
426 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1970); Nixon v. Secretary of Navy, 422 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1970).
See generally, Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1972, 1973 DUKE
L.J. 213 n.42 (1973).
65. In a decision where similar environmental values were involved and the
agency (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture) failed or refused to act regarding cancellation of
registration of the pesticide DDT, the court, characterizing the inaction as somewhat
equivalent to an administrative order, declared, "when administrative inaction has
precisely the same impact on the rights of parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot
preclude judicial review by casting its decisions in the form of inaction." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, (D.C. Cir. 1970). Being more specific
as to the lack of any rulemaking to implement an agency mandate, the Ninth Circuit
contended that an agency (Bureau of Indian Affairs) does not have within its administrative discretion the power to not issue certain regulations if statutorily ordered.
Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
66. Illustrative of this demand is Chief Judge Bazelon's increasingly strong arguments for the necessity of more explicit formal agency guidelines especially when
environmental values are in question. Implying that the lack of such a framework may
be an abuse of discretion he states,
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Under the force of these arguments, it appears very possible that the BLM, via the Secretary of Interior, can be compelled to in fact develop and implement some procedures by
informal rulemaking to insure that the siting requirements or
duties may be fulfilled in the granting of rights-of-way for energy developments. Under the FLPMA, the procedure by which
the BLM may be compelled to implement this process by informal rulemaking is contained in the general policy title. The Act
states that "[iun administering public land statutes and exercising discretionary authority granted by them, the Secretary
[shall] be required to establish compehensive rules and regulations .
,,*"67
The issuance of a right-of-way is clearly a discretionary action coming within the scope of this mandatory
rulemaking requirement. Further, the Act requires that,
"[tihe Secretary shall issue regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this Act with respect to the manageIn anment, use, and protection of the public lands .... ,,68
other section entitled "Rules and regulations," the statute
again requires that "[t]he Secretary . . . shall promulgate
"...
61 In sum, there is a very strong
rules and regulations .
legal rationale to compel the Secretary of Interior to implement, by rulemaking procedures as outlined in section 553 of
the Administrative Procedures Act, rules and regulations for
review of potential energy development rights-of-way. These
rules and regulations should insure the identification of the site
or sites which will be the most compatible with and do no
unnecessary harm to the protected environmental values.
F. Exercise of Power by the BLM-Cases
Once rules and regulations are adopted, the agency is legally bound to administer their activities and decisionmaking
within the principled framework specified in these rules and
[The "new era" in administrative law] means . . . that courts will go
further in requiring the agency to establish a decision-making process
adequate to protect the interests of all "consumers" of the natural environment . . . . [Tin cases of great technological complexity, the best
way for courts to guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative
decisions . . . is to establish a decisionmaking process which assures a
reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific
community and the public.
International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-52.
67. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(a)(5) (Supp. 1978).
68. Id. §1733(a) (emphasis added).
69. Id. §1740. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
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regulations. 0 Courts which require the principled framework of
decisionmaking see as a necessary element of this framework
the existence of some systematic process by which the agency
administrator can exercise a good faith assessment of alternative decisions available to him. This good faith test is especially
applicable when there are basic public resources or environmental values being affected by the decision. In the landmark
Scenic Hudson case, 7 the court held that the Commissioner of
the Federal Power Commission did not have within his scope
of permissible discretion the authority to disregard the consideration of prudent alternatives to a proposed action, therein a
1000 mpgawatt pump storage power plant on the Hudson
River.72 The court then stressed the necessity of developing an
administrative process (or record) which insures adequate compliance with statutory requirements.
The agency must always act upon the record made, and if that
is not sufficient, it should see the record is supplemented before
it acts. It must always preserve the elements of fair play, but it
is not fair play for it to create a injustice, instead of remedying
one, by omiting to inform itself. .... 73

The analogy is direct between the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and the BLM's mandates as the manager of public
lands for net social benefit to pursue the regulatory function of
granting rights-of-way. Considering the BLM's duty to, among
other conditions, "require location of the right-of-way along a
route that will cause the least damage,"'" it is strongly asserted
70. This principle is stated in a recent appellate decision, "When an administrative agency promulgates rules to govern its proceedings, these rules must be scrupulously observed." Pacific Molasses Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 356 F.2d 386, 389
(5th Cir. 1966). See also United States v. Wilbur, 427 F. 2d 947 (9th Cir. 1970) cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 954 (1970); Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Supreme Court principle on which this statement is based is in
a 1957 case involving the State Department's deviation from its own rules.
"[Riegulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon
him as well as the citizen, and that this principle holds even when the administrative
action under review is discretionary in nature." Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372
(1957). See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 546 (1959) (separate opinion of
Justice Frankfurter).
71. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n. 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
72. Id. at 612.
73. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd
342 U.S. 950 (1952), cited with approval in 354 F.2d at 621.
74. 43 U.S.C.A. §1765(b)(v) (Supp. 1978).
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that without a comprehensive assessment of all feasible alternatives, there is an abuse of secretarial discretion under the Act
in the form of acting ignorantly of certain omitted alternative
locations for the right-of-way. This contention for all comprehensive alternative analyses was greatly bolstered with the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).71 Among other requirements of the NEPA there is an

explicit statutory requirement to "utilize a systematic interdis7
ciplinary approach"7 to identify and assess alternatives.
Soon after the passage of the NEPA, it was perceived by
many agencies that such alternative studies were to be necessary only if an environmental impact statement (EIS) was required and written. 7 Their narrow view was that the alternative requirement of section 4332(2)(E) 7' was only a repetition
of the EIS alternative section that requires all EIS's to contain
a discussion of "alternatives to the proposed action."0 However, recent decisions have explicitly distinguished the latter
alternatives discussion requirement in an EIS from the prior
more encompassing alternatives section which is applicable to
ongoing administrative activities.8 ' In the seminal case on this
issue, the Fifth Circuit divides section 4332(2)(C) into two
separate requirements, "requirements as to methodology and
writing requirements.""2
Again the analogy of the BLM's assessment of potential
alternative sites for energy development is direct and clear.
Coupling the NEPA's methodology requirements of section
4332(2)(E) with the FLPMA's above-discussed requirements,
it can be concluded that indeed the BLM must "identify and
develop methods and procedures" wherein it can fulfill the
other methodology requirement to "study, develop and de75. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347 (1970).
76. Id. §4332(2)(A).
77. Id. §4332(2)(E).
78. F. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 320,338 (1974).
79. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (2)(E).
80. Id. §4332(2)(C)(iii).
81. See, e.g., Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1975): Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99
(N.D. Ga. 1975).
82. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1132 (5th
Cir. 1974).
83. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(B).
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scribe appropriate alternatives" or sites. 8 A troublesome and
perhaps limiting aspect of analogizing these NEPA cases to an
argument for compelling the BLM's development of a comprehensive siting methodology is that, in these cases, there was an
already defined proposal or action before the agency for consideration.
A basic and critical characteristic of a timely siting methodology is that there must be a comprehensive alternative assessment in anticipation of any potential proposals and not
after a formal proposal or right-of-way application is initiated.
While the Fifth Circuit seems willing to require such assessments throughout the agency planning process, other courts
may be reluctant to so improve this assessment requirement
without the prerequisite existence of a formal proposal.
If the timing of such alternative assessment requirements
is in the latter stages of a right-of-way review and decisionmaking, the utility of the section 4332(2)(E) duty is minimal as an
argument supporting the necessity to implement a nomination
or prequalification type siting process. The Supreme Court in
the Rockfish case first faced this timing question in deciding
when a proposed rate increase for recycled materials by Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) became a proposal under
the NEPA. The court held that there is a proposal only at "the
time at which it [the agency] makes a recommendation or
report on a proposal for federal action.""8 The conclusion from
this could be that no necessity for imposing section 4332(2)(E)
requirements occurs until the agency itself creates a proposal
by some definitive recommendation or report. The question of
when activities pass from a conceptual stage into something
specific enough to be a proposed action under the NEPA was
judicially discussedin detail by Judge Wright wherein he developed a four-part test to apply to agency activities. 6
84. Id. §4332(2)(E).
85. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975).
86. Determining when to draft an impact statement [i.e., when
there is a proposed action under NEPAl . . . obviously requires a reconciliation of these competing concerns. Some balance must be struck and
several factors should be weighed in the balance. How likely is the technology to prove commercially feasible, and how soon will that occur? To
what extent is meaningful information presently available on the effects
of application . . . and of alternatives and their effects? To what extent
are irretrievable commitments being made and options precluded as the
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Judge Wright later had opportunity to apply this test to
an issue directly analogous to the siting question when the
Sierra Club petitioned the Department of Interior to consider
a whole regional energy development potential (in the Northern Great Plains area of the Powder River Basin) to be a proposed action under the NEPA. The court rejected offhandedly
the Rockfish judicial deference to agency determination of
what is an action or program. 7 In determining that the Department of Interior contemplated the circuit action, the court held
such contemplation would constitute a proposal for major federal action." Judge Wright relied heavily upon the existence of
an agency planning process which was considering energy development in the whole region in an attempt to place the potential impacts of coal development in perspective and thereby
assist "in the management of the natural and human resources
of the region." 89 Because of this land use plan's existence, the
court declared,
It is our view that when the federal government, through exercise
of its power to approve leases, mining plans, rights-of-way and
water option contracts, attempts to "control development" of a
definite region, it is engaged in a regional program constituting
major federal action within the meaning of NEPA whether it
labels its attempts a plan, a program or nothing at all.0

In determining when there is a proposed action, the
threshold is that time when, "the agency may have the opportunity to assess the environmental impact of its plans before
committing itself, even tentatively to action." 9 ' The court then
proceeded to apply the four factor SIPI test" and concluded
3
that there was a contemplated or proposed action .
On appeal, Justice Powell in a confusing seven to two madevelopment program progresses? How severe will the environmental effects be if the technology does prove commercially feasible?
Scientists Inst. for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 481 F. 2d 1079,
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88. Id. at 874-76. See also Conservation Soc'y. of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of
Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 636 (1973) where the court held that a highway network
which was "possible of accomplishment with legislative and federal approval over a
long-range period of time" was to be considered a proposed action.
89. 514 F.2d at 876.
90. Id. at 878.
91. Id. at 879.
92. 481 F.2d at 1079.
93. 514 F.2d at 880.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

jority opinion, overruled Wright's substantive determination
that there was a proposed action, endorsing in total the contrary district court's conclusions." As a part of the Supreme
Court's determination that no proposed action existed, the criteria of practical reasons was used and the fact that "there is
nothing that could be the subject of the analysis envisioned
[by the NEPA]."'' Indeed, the Court did not directly dispute
the circuit court's conclusion that a contemplated plan or program could become a proposed action,97 but only overruled
Wright's determination on the merits that such was contemplated in this case. In another statement seemingly contradictory to the rigid Rockfish holding, Justice Powell states that
the legislative history of the NEPA supports the view that, "by
requiring an impact statement Congress intended to assure
such consideration during the development of a proposal
Later, however, the court does declare that the four factor
balancing test is not within the province of the Court's review
powers under the NEPA and confusingly endorses its earlier
rigid Rockfish definition of proposal. The real confusion occurs
then, when discounting a court's power to use a balancing test,
Justice Powell himself decides to articulate balancing tests for
determining when a regional program becomes an action subject to an EIS.11 This determination the Court apparently
leaves to the "informed discretion of the responsible official."' 00
Even in the alleged affirmation of the Rockfish view of when
some agency process becomes a proposal, the Court confuses
and ignores the realities of the NEPA process by quoting
Rockfish with approval, "the moment at which an agency must
have a final statement ready 'is the time at which it makes a
recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action.' ,
There is no discussion of when the NEPA process must start
which is the real time for alternatives assessments, a fact noted
02
by Brennan and Marshall in dissent.
94. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 400 (1976).
95. Id. at 401.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 406, n. 15.
98, Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 406.
100. Id. at 412.
101. Id. at 406.
102. Id. at 417.
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In sum, while it appears Kleppe places significant limitations on any claim to compel the BLM to do early siting prequalifications under the alternatives assessment requirements
of section 4332(2)(C) of the NEPA, there is still a strong potential of sustaining the claim using both the NEPA section
4332(2)(E) and the FLPMA mandates as cumulative statutory
support. While the Court in Kleppe did appear to reject any
affirmative duty being imposed on an agency to do comprehensive alternatives impact assessment until a formal recommendation or action, it did endorse the intent of the NEPA to have
such assessments occur in the preproposal stage. 0 3 Furthermore, Kleppe never dealt with section 4332(2)(E) and the duties under that section. The focus of the decision was narrowed
to only the EIS alternatives requirement of section 4332(2)(E).
G. FLPMA and NEPA
Notwithstanding the Kleppe confusions, the passage of the
FLPMA combined with the NEPA's broad duties under sections 4332(2)(B) and (E) appears to significantly bolster the
rationale of compelling the implementation of a comprehensive
siting process. A major constraint on much judicial intervention into agency discretion under only the NEPA has been the
relatively general language and policy of the Act. With the
FLPMA there is a significantly greater level of specificity directing the BLM to do certain definitive acts as a part of its
planning and decisionmaking. Specifically, there is language in
the planning section directing the BLM to begin assessing alternatives as a part of the planning process prior to any formal
proposed action. Therein, Congress directs that, "In the development of land use plans, the Secretary shall consider the relative scarcity of the [land resource] values involved and the
availability of alternative means (including recycling) and sites
for realization of those values.""'1 As argued earlier, the development of such land use plans is an integral part of the Secretary's responsibility under his rulemaking requirements.
The clear statutory duties to carry out the planning process, especially the inventory and alternatives assessments
prior to any actions on either withdrawals, rights-of-way, or
management decisions, implies that if the BLM is to satisfy
103. Id. at 406 n. 15.
104. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(c)(6) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
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these duties, then the time when the assessment of alternatives
or siting must occur is well before the actual formal applications for rights-of-way or other management decisions.
The shortcoming relative to the BLM's planning responsibilities, in the prior discussion of alternatives assessment cases
under the NEPA, is that most of these NEPA cases are in the
context of questions about writing EIS's under section
4332(2) (C) for a specifically proposed project. In order to relate
these cases and their judicial standards to the prequalification
or nomination siting process, it is necessary to identify a rationale for extending the judicial consideration requirements beyond merely the proposed action stage or EIS preparation.
The basic legal rationale for such an extension is based on
the presumption that the statutory intent of the FLPMA, especially the planning section, and the NEPA are so similar that
the judicial arguments regarding the desirability of extending
the considerations requirements into the overall planning of
agencies under the NEPA apply even more to the BLM which
is subject to both the NEPA and the FLPMA. 105 Therefore,
105. Statutory Similarities Between the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act
National Environmental
Policy Act
Section

Phraseology

Federal Land Policy and
Management Act
Section

Phraseology

42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (2)(A)

"utilize

a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated
use of the natural and
social sciences."

43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1712 (c)(2)
(Supp. 1978)

"use a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration
of physical, biological
economic and other
sciences."

§ 4331 (b)(A)

"preserve important
historic, cultural and
natural aspects of our
national heritage."

§ 1701 (a)(8)

"protect the quality of
scientific, historical,
ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resources, and archeological values."

§ 4332 (2)(F)

"weigh the . . . long
term character of environmental
problems."

§ 1712(c)(7)

"weigh long term benefits to the public
against short term
benefits."
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certain NEPA cases become even more applicable to this argument for compelling broad level alternatives assessment
throughout the agency planning.
One such early NEPA case, albeit an EIS challenge, discusses at length the necessity under the NEPA to take account
of environmental considerations continuously during the
agency's operation, whether an EIS is required or not or
whether there is a formal proposed action or not.10 A later
similar case focused on the specific issue of whether there was
actual agency consideration of environmental values in its decisionmaking and planning procedures. 07 The court's test of
compliance was application of sections 4332(2)(A), (B) and (E)
§ 4332(2)(C)
(iv)

"[consider] the relationship between short
term uses of man's environment and
the
maintenance and enhancement of long
term productivity."

§ 1712(c)(5)

"consider present and
potential uses of the
public lands."

§ 4332(2)(E), "study, develop and
describe appropriate
alternatives to recommend courses of action in any proposal
which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative
uses of available resources."

§ 1712(c)(6)

"consider the relative
scarcity of the values
involved and the availability of alternative
means (including recycling) and sites for
realization of those
values."

106. The congressional mandate [of section 4331(b)] is clear. Federal officials are to appraise continuously all their activities not only in
terms of strict economic or technological considerations but also with
reference to broad environmental concerns . . . . Subject only to the
limits of practicality, they are to strive constantly to improve federal
programs to preserve and enhance the environment. In other words, federal officials are required. . . to incorporate the consideration of environmental factors into the decision making process.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174
(6th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). The court further noted the Congressional intent
that environmental considerations permeate the whole of agency procedures by citing
the following language of S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969): "[NEPA
would] provide all agencies and all Federal officials with a legislative mandate and a
responsibility to consider the consequences of their actions on the environment. This
would be true of the licensing functions of independent agencies as well as the ongoing
activities of the regular federal agencies." (emphasis in original). 468 F.2d at 1175.
107. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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as "directives that are intended to insure the integration of
sound environmental planning principles and methods into
normal agency procedures."'' 01 The court viewed the EIS requirement of section 4332(2)(C) as primarily documentation of
the other required activities within the overall agency planning. 10' Focusing on the specific consideration requirement
under section 4332(2)(C) of the NEPA, the court held that in
order to comply with this section, an agency must "search out,
develop and follow procedures reasonably calculated to bring
environmental factors to peer status with dollars and technology in their decision making.""'
This argument is significantly bolstered by the FLPMA's
requirements to implement a planning system and the environmental consideration requirements contained therein."' To reiterate, the planning system is intended to be the basic guidance for management of the public lands"' and the framework
for management decisions'" made by the Secretary. Explicitly
included as a management decision are exclusions of one or
more principal uses in favor of one or more other such uses."'
Rights-of-way, again, are by definition "principal or major
uses.""- In this statutory context, then, any actions which the
Secretary takes regarding a right-of-way which in fact excludes
any other major use is a decisionmaking activity with the
framework of the land use planning process mandated by the
Act. Further, there is strong argument that in order to fully
comply with the requirements of the rights-of-way process," 6
there must be some direct coordination between the grant of a
right-of-way and the planning process wherein grants are compatible with the overall land use inventory and assessments
required under the planning process.
108. Id. at 1132.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1133. See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex.

1973). The Council on Environmental Quality, now given power to promulgate regulations under the NEPA as a result of President Carter's Executive Order 1191 (May 24,
1977), declares the same intent of the NEPA in what are presumably to become official
regulations, "[§4332(2)(C)] requires agencies to build into their decision making
process, beginning at the earliest possible point, an appropriate and careful consideration of the environmental aspects.
... 40 C.F.R. 1500.1(a).
111. 43 U.S.C.A. §1712 (Supp. 1978).
112. Id. §1701(a)(7).
113. Id. §1712(e).
114. Id. §1712(e)(i).
115. Id. §1702(1).
116. Id. §1765. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Congressional and administrative support for this idea of
the planning system being the basic guide for decisions is evidenced in the responses to committee inquiry by the Department of Interior in the Hearings on the FLPMA, wherein the
Department clearly indicated the policy of utilizing the land
use plans as basic prerequisites to any secretarial decisions or
commitments." 7
H. The Nominating Process
The nomination or prequalification siting process includes
two basic subprocesses or stages. The first is the macrolevel
inventory and identification of all existing and potential land
use values within a zone or area which has all the industrial
prerequisites necessary for the contemplated development. The
second more analytical subprocess which follows the inventory
is the initial balancing of the relative land related values involved wherein certain sites are excluded from further consideration for development and others are preferred for more detailed consideration and in essence nominated, or prequalified,
for development. Once the preferred sites are identified, any
utility applicants desiring to develop in the site would submit
the necessary rights-of-way applications triggering a more detailed analysis through the EIS process. An important point
here is to distinguish the initial balancing process where basic
resource value tradeoffs and conflict resolutions occur from
what would be the subsequent EIS process tradeoffs which are
more site specific and less extensive geographically. It is in this
pre-EIS stage that the truly crucial macrolevel decisions and
value judgments are made involving extensive lands and resources.
The procedural form of these specific selections are rightsof-way grants. Both of these management decisions involve
resolution of value conflicts on the part of the Secretary and the
BLM. Because of the above-cited judicial emphasis stressing
the necessity of scrutinizing any agency process which involves
environmental values, both stages of the siting balancing are
most notably subject to intense judicial review.1'1 If section
117. See Senate Hearings supra note 33 at 91-94 and testimony of Curt Berklund
at 3-4.
118. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829
(D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913
(1976).
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1712 of the FLPMA clearly extended the policies and
proceduralmandates of the NEPA into the pre-EIS or planning
stage, then similarly, the FLPMA would extend the
substantive NEPA review standards imposed by courts to the
same pre-EIS planning procedures.
Given both the inclination of the courts in following the
landmark decision of Overton Park"9 to limit the agency's discretion involved in the actual decision by looking to applicable
statutory mandates to protect the environment and the growing inclination of certain circuits to at least require equal consideration of such values even if only the NEPA is involved,
there is a strong argument that certain language of the FLPMA
is to be interpreted as direct statutory limitation upon the
scope of discretion afforded the Secretary's actual balancing
decisions within the siting process. Specifically, in the preright-of-way granting stage of the siting process, the mandates
of the planning title clearly impose significant requirements on
the BLM decisionmaking to establish a priority for certain values over others for certain identified areas.'
In two other sections of the statute, this establishment of
priorities is also given special emphasis. In the land use planning inventory, the Secretary must give priority to an inventory
of these areas of critical environmental concern (A.C.E.C.).1
Probably more important, the declaration of policy section
imposes a duty on the Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations for protection of A.C.E.C.'s. 2 2 With these reassertions
by Congress, it seems clear that the Act's intent is for actual
balancing decisions to establish a priority for these environmental values over other values when they are in conflict. Although the language on its face would seem to support such a
conclusion, it is necessary to look at this language in the con119. 401 U.S. 402.
120. "Areas of critical environmental concern" are defined as:
areas within the public lands where special management attention is
required (when such areas are developed or used or where no development
is required) to protect and prevent irreparable damage to important historic, cultural, or scenic values, fish and wildlife resources or other natural systems or processes, or to protect life and safety from natural hazards.
43 U.S.C.A. §1702(a) (Supp. 1978).
121. Id. §1701(a)(1).
122. Id. §1701(a)(11).
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text of the whole statute before such a conclusion can be generally accepted.' 3
Reiterating, these two goals are subject to guidance from
the principles of multiple use and sustained yield wherein protection of public land areas of critical environmental concerns' 4 must be reconciled with "[recognition] of the Nation's
need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber and fiber
from the public lands.' 2 5 Initially, resolution of such a dilemma by the agency seems to be not subject to a judicial
interpretation which implies a favoring of one over the other.
However, there can possibly be such an interpretation if viewed
in the context of the mandatory compliance with the principles
of the FLPMA's definition of multiple use ' and the NEPA as
a part of the general system of environmental policy and planning.'2 Recognizing the inherent conflicts between the developmental and environmental goals, a close examination of the
language requiring protection of environmental values as opposed to recognition of development values allows for an argument that in certain so identified areas the BLM has a clearly
unqualified duty to prioritize protection of A.C.E.C.'s. The
developmental responsibility, however, can be argued to allow
the Secretary a certain amount of discretionary leeway in how
this is done.
The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 is the statutory guidance for recognition of development potentials as
specified in the FLPMA.'25 In that policy statement itself the
123. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). See also, Brown v. Duchesne,
13 U.S. (19 Howard) 183 (1856).
124. See supra note 120.
125. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(a)(12) (Supp. 1978).
126. Id. §1702(c).
127. The use of the NEPA to infer intent or assist the court in interpreting other
agency statutes has been clarified by the Supreme Court in the Flint Ridge case
wherein the Court stated, referring to the Senate conference report, on the NEPA,
The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each agency of
the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in
[NEPAl unless the existing laws applicable to such agency's operations
expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives
impossible . . . and that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow
construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance.
115 Cong. Rec. 39703 (1969) (House Conferees).
Flint Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976) (emphasis
added).
128. 30 U.S.C. 21(a)(2) (1970).
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development goals are to be balanced to "assure satisfaction of
industrial security and environmental needs.' '1 9 In addition,
that same minerals policy requires the development of methods
"to lessen any adverse impact. . . upon the physical environment.' 13 Therefore, recognition is in reality a balanced recognition requiring at least equal consideration of environmental
needs. At the same time there is no coequal requirement of
balancing inherent in the A.C.E.C. protection requirements of
the FLPMA once such areas are identified. The conclusion that
there is a mandate for protection of A.C.E.C. values but only
a requirement for discretionary recognition of other values
when in conflict argues that the mandatory environmental protection will prevail over the discretionary development recognition for the A.C.E.C.'s.' 31 The most rational way to avoid a
collision is to affirmatively specify to all potential utility applicants where these prioritizations will occur and where the developmental goal of energy development will not be in conflict
with the environmental goal. This due notice to the industry,
of course, must be timely and prior to extensive investments
and commitments to sites which are likely to be in an A.C.E.C.
I. Basis on the Principles of Multiple Use
Another statutory support for protection prioritization in
the FLPMA lies in the principles of multiple use. By definition,
this guiding doctrine requires the following principles to be
applied to land management practices and decisions of the
BLM. They
(a) must "best meet the present and future needs of the
American people";
(b) must "take into account the long term needs of further generations for renewable and non-renewable resources";
(c) must not have any "permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land" and the "the quality of the environment";
(d) must "not necessarily [be] the combination of uses
that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit
3
output." 1
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. §21(a)(4).
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
43 U.S.C.A. §1702(2) (Supp. 1978).
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These criteria weigh toward protection of options for future
land resource demand over immediate returns of current demands thus being supportive of both the NEPA'3 and other
3
language guiding the planning process.'
The only cases which directly addressed the scope of discretion under the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act,' 35
gave broad deference to the agency in interpreting and implementing the Act. 13 In a recent appellate case, the court deferred to the expertise and discretion of the Forest Service's
determination of the best mix of land uses. However, the court
did inquire into the actual planning process used and the
weights assigned to certain values. Therein multiple use is defined by the court as management "to provide maximum benefits to the greatest number of persons possible."' 38 The significant point is that three of the four above-mentioned multiple
use principles or planning criteria (a,b, and c) were not contained in the old Multiple Use Act on which the above decision
was based. 13 This addition of new language, all stressing
greater preference for consideration of the environmental goal,
is further support for the argument for an environmental prioritization mandate existing in the FLPMA for A.C.E.C. lands.4 0
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the siting
process must insure that the A.C.E.C.'s are identified first,
then prioritized for protection, and further that the Secretary's
decisions in the pre-EIS planning stage of nominating or prequalifying zones for potential development takes into account
this prioritization. If the Secretary does not in fact show on the
administrative record how this identification of such
A.C.E.C.'s land prioritization did occur, the court review of the
nominations would likely conclude (or at least would certainly
133. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1976).
134. 43 U.S.C.A. §1712(b) (Supp. 1978).
135. 16 U.S.C. §528 (1976).
136. In one case brought under the NEPA involving an action done under the
Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act, the court held a District Ranger had discretion
to determine what mix of uses are appropriate for designation of a wildlife habitat.
Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. W.Va. 1972).
138. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F. 2d 1292, 1304 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
139. See generally, PLLRC REPOT 43 (170).
140. See generally, Note, Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use
System, 82 YALE L.J. 787 (1973); S. 507, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 2137
(1976).
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allow a conclusion) that this lack in the record was grounds for
holding the decision to be arbitrary and capricious. While some
utilities may criticize the identification of these areas, the timing of the identification prior to major industrial commitments
is far superior to the uncertainties of trying to second guess the
BLM as to what in fact will be A.C.E.C.'s after a formal rightof-way application is filed. Using the A.C.E.C. identification
mandate, the BLM clearly has ample authorization, indeed
responsibility, to prequalify areas by the process of eliminating
certain areas from further consideration as viable energy development sites.
J. Support in the A. C.E.C. Definition
In looking at the statutory definition of A.C.E.C.'s, it is
explicit that the total spectrum of environmental values is to
be included, especially with the catchall phrase, "or other natural systems or processes."'' Because many of these values are
very widespread or at times even ubiquitous, the selection of a
parcel of land as an A.C.E.C. requires some threshold of relative concentration or high level of one or more of these values
in order to be designated as an A.C.E.C.; otherwise the special
character or special management defining these areas is meaningless.
The key language for determining this threshold for designation is: (a) special management attention being required, (b)
potential for irreparable damage, and, (c) the existing value
being important. If it can be shown then that these three prerequisite conditions exist for any of the values on any parcel of
land, the Secretary must designate them to be A.C.E.C.'s. To
ignore them would be challengable according to the above arguments. Because of locally unique factors, special circumstances, and generally a lack of any clear indicators for designation,
the initial determination of whether the three conditions exist
will and should be within the discretion of the Secretary and
the BLM technical staff. This assumes, of course, good faith
consideration and analysis of all affected values throughout the
identification process. The situation is somewhat analogous to
the threshold determination as to whether a proposed action
will significantly affect the human environment and require an
EIS under section 4332(2)(C) of the NEPA.
For a court to intervene into the agency's threshold deter141. 43 U.S.C.A. §1702(a) (Supp. 1978).
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mination, there should be some further statutory guidance
against which the court may review whether the determination
was arbitrary. If the court intervenes without such further
guidance, there is the problem of great administrative uncertainty about the potential future judicial reaction to agency
planning, thus creating a real dilemma in developing long term
administrative procedures. Fortunately, there are a number of
federal statutes which do (in most cases) specify standards for
determining the location of areas of importance or irreparability which require special attention, thus helping to lessen the
dilemma of such second guessing.
In other words, there is indeed "law to apply" to further
define and limit the Secretary's discretion in the decision of
designating A.C.E.C.'s. Statutes such as the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act are ones with which the Secretary must
comply in the planning inventory.' The A.C.E.C. identification and designation decision as a part of this inventory must
likewise so apply the applicable standards to each land parcel
to determine whether such land has any of the the statutorily
specified values making it by definition an A.C.E.C. The specific language for each statute used as criteria for designation
must be that language which is relatively clear on its face as
to meaning and also capable of being used to spatially identify
land areas having such criteria for designation as A.C.E.C.'s.
A more detailed specification of criteria is contained in the
regulations and manuals under each of these acts which should
be included as considerations in the A.C.E.C. decision by the
BLM, especially when Congress specifies another agency to be
specially qualified and so designated as the interpreter of these
criteria. 4 3
In the prequalification stage, the BLM would review all
lands within the economic feasibility zone for the potential
large scale facility and identify any land areas or zones which
do contain any of these environmental values in the listed statutes. Once identified, however, the A.C.E.C.'s are not
necessarily eliminated from consideration for energy development. The identification only "red flags" the area and such
"red flagging" indicates the necessity of designating the zone
an A.C.E.C. under special management attention. At this
142. Id. §1712(c).
143. E.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§1533, 1536 (1976).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

point, if the BLM ignores these identifications of statutorily
protected values, and proceeds in viewing the zone as subject
to only ordinary management practices, it would seem such an
ignoring is arbitrary in light of applicable "law to apply" from
the statutes listed as well as the explicit requirement to identify and specify zones where special management attention is
required. '" For example, if the Fish and Wildlife Service has
identified an area of critical habitat for a certain endangered
species, the BLM would logically be compelled to so designate
the area an A.C.E.C. The existence of any statutorily specified
environmental value will suffice to impose the necessity for
such an A.C.E.C. designation because the A.C.E.C. definition
lists the values with an "or" separation, meaning any one value
is important enough for the designation. If more than one value
exists in any zone, it should be so specified so that the later
weighing process can evaluate the cumulative environmental
value of the A.C.E.C.'s within the study area of potential sites
for the major facilities.
Once the non-A.C.E.C. zones are identified by the process
of elimination, there is the more important analysis of relative
potential adverse offsite impacts on the A.C.E.C.'s from the
non-A.C.E.C. development sites. It is at this point that the
BLM must determine whether the A.C.E.C.'s fall into one of
two categories. The first is one in which the development could
occur near the A.C.E.C. without significant adverse impact
with special management attention. The second category
would be those areas in which no development is allowed in
order to prevent irreparable damage. This is a threshold determination which is a matter requiring professional and technical
analysis. The judicial scrutiny of this particular step would
most likely be minimal except to screen against obvious abuses
or arbitrary determinations. The real decision, subject to review of a more substantial nature, is the ultimate site selection
from among alternatives identified in the elimination process.
Once certain development sites are identified as the residual areas outside the designated A.C.E.C.'s, or as acceptable
within the A.C.E.C. under special management, the EIS stage
begins wherein the relative environmental impacts are assessed
for each alternative site. If through this process it is evident
144. 43 U.S.C.A. §1702(a) (Supp. 1978).
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that one site will cause least damage to the environment,"' the
BLM would seem to be compelled to select that site for the
right-of-way grant. Otherwise, there seems to be a strong case
for claiming an arbitrary and capricious decision in choosing a
more environmentally damaging site. It must be kept in mind
here that only sites within the general economic feasibility zone
were ever considered. Therefore, the requirement in the rightsof-way section of "taking into consideration feasibility" ' , is
satisfied long before such alternatives assessments occur. Any
argument that a more environmentally damaging site should
be selected lacks any support in the section of the FLPMA
dealing with the right-of-way choice.' 47 Nowhere in the rightsof-way section is there a requirement to maximize economic
efficiency. This would be the complement to the requirement
that the grant insure that the "location of the right-of-way
[will be the one] that will cause least damage to the environment."'' As A.C.E.C.'s, only the site or corridor which causes
the least cumulative damage to all these areas and their environmental values would be acceptable as the proper right-ofway under sections 1765(a) and 1765(b).
This conclusion does not mean, however, that there will
never be any development which requires a right-of-way grant
through or in an A.C.E.C. This only means that among all the
reasonable alernative sites identified within the economic feasibility zone, the one chosen must be the one which would
cause the relatively least damage to the environment. A restriction requiring no damage must come from some other more
restrictive directive such as the Endangered Species Act'48
which imposes absolute safeguards for the protection of endangered species habitat. If there is so much land with such absolute restrictions on it that no sites remain for locating facilities
in the feasibility zone, the right-of-way review should stop and
145. Id. §1765(b)(v).
146. Id.
147. Id. §§1763-65.
148. Id. §1765(b)(v) (emphasis added).
149. 16 U.S.C. §1531 (1976). This act specifically directs that, "all other Federal
departments and agencies shall . . . insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and
threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat . . . which is
determined . . . to be critical." Id. §1536. See Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d
1064, 1068-71 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978); National Wildlife Fed'n. v.
Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371-74 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
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an attempt should be made to identify other economically feasible zones in another acceptable area. A proper prescreening
of such zones prior to the economic feasibility zone identification should, however, identify the majority of such absolute
restrictions because of their usually notorious nature among
the agencies or reviewers of agencies.
Once the prequalification process has identified all the
A.C.E.C.'s at a macrolevel, the potential applicants for the
rights-of-way can focus on residual areas and make their own
internal evaluation of what specific sites they prefer, after
which the formal rights-of-way application can occur. It is desirable here to allow an application for multiple alternative
sites. This enables both the applicant and the BLM to evaluate
all sites without biases due to prior political or economic commitments to one site. It also allows for negotiation and settling
by stipulations conflicts between the applicant and the BLM
at a stage where such adjustments and modifications are most
feasible. Most important to the public interest, this staging of
the siting process gives much more reliable assurance that the
critical environmental values have been identified and protected prior to the development negotiation stage and irretrievable political or economic commitments.
K. Conclusion of Legal Basis
With such a comprehensive process as that proposed, the
successful implementation requires good faith commitments
by both government and the utility industry throughout the
processes leading up to the ultimate decision on a site. If there
is an administrative breakdown or inclination to abuse or ignore the process at any important formative stage, the resulting decisions will be adversely affected by increasing the potential for an arbitrary or bad faith determination. The reality of
the complexity and intertwining of federal decisionmaking illustrates further the dilemma of relying totally on litigation to
force agency implementation of complex planning procedures.
The overall reason therefore for developing a rather comprehensive and detailed legal rationale is not to encourage reliance
on a continuous legal challenge to the BLM for success, but to
identify what are the supportive arguments to begin the process of good faith compliance.
II.

SITING METHODOLOGY

By limiting this study only to siting, there is no attempt
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to discount the importance of the other aspects of energy development decisionmaking. Indeed, the presiting issues of the actual need for such development are perhaps the most important decisions. This article presumes such issues to have been
addressed in some systematic and equitable manner prior to
the actual siting decision. The siting process is based on the
concept that there will be some level of energy development
necessarily on or near public lands. Within the present institutional framework, this siting methodology can do nothing more
than identify the relatively best site or sites for a potential
development using the criteria of least cumulative environmental degradation. Once this information is developed and
arrayed for the decisionmaking entities involved, other decisional factors will come into play. However, in a legal context
the public land manager has an affirmative trust responsibility
to make decisions which will be the best in terms of protecting
the total public interest under the public trust doctrine. 50
The problem of finding the optimal solution in allocating
public resources has been a terribly frustrating issue of economic theorists for many years;' however, with proper limitations and perspective, this problem is solvable in the context
of this methodology. Generally defined, the best public welfare
decision which allocates public common goods is the one which
results in the greatest total net public benefits after deducting
the total net public costs.15 More specifically to the siting decisions, the best choice will be that which results in the least
costs to the public in terms of reduction in the total public
values on the land. The real problem for pure optimization
analysis is, of course, defining and in some manner qualifying
these vague and often debatable values.
Fortunately, the analytical economic question of what has
value can be conveniently deferred by accepting what the Congress and the judiciary have defined as values. These determi150. See Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Application in the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 10 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. Dic.. 1, 16-53 (1973). See generally, Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 971 (1970).
151. See, e.g., Hicks, Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696
(1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and InterpersonalComparisons of
Utility, Id. at 549; McGuire & Aaron, Efficiency and Equity in the Optimal Supply of
a Public Good, 51 REv. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 31-39 (1969).
152. MISHAN, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1971).
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nations of value do in fact assign rights in the various land
resources to the various groups who desire to use them. The
eternal and complex issues of distributional equity and the
correct assignment of such rights are presumed to be addressed, however loosely or politically, by Congress in the legislative process. One writer endorses the idea of assuming the
inherent value or right assignments of the institutions and beginning the optimizing analysis from that point. 53 Public land
resources have a myriad of such assignments. Given the acceptance of these values as the true measures of the public welfare,
the problem becomes one of efficient maximization of these
values by the siting methodology.
This welfare efficiency in the siting decision is measured
by the cumulative level of the assigned resource values. Any
determination of what is the best site must be done in the
framework of comparative or alternative assessments to avoid
the unsolvable problem of the true optimum choice. Because
the siting decision is one of choosing between a limited set of
alternative sites, the comparatively best solution can be developed.
The siting process is one of comparative assessment to find
the relatively best site as a part of the larger energy development decision process. The analysis of the optimal is focused
on a spatial differential welfare function between sites for each
assigned welfare value. A spatial differential is necessary; otherwise, any site would be the optimum as they all would result
in the same total value level no matter where they were on the
land. Variability over our public lands is obvious. Coupled with
inherent spatial variability is the inherent differential of impacts from an energy development wherein the relative distance from the development affects the intensity of impact.' 5
The relative welfare efficiency of the decision or site chosen
then is determined by the relative level of resulting welfare
values on the land which is subsequently determined by subtracting or adding the relative degradation'55 or enhancement
153. Dorfman, The Technical Basis for Decision Making, in THE GOVERNANCE OF
COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 5, 20 (E. Haefele, ed. 1974).

154. See Blonquist, The Effect of Electric Utility Power Plant Location on Area
Property Value 50 LAND ECONOMICS 97 (1974).
155. The degradation of any welfare value is defined herein as an externality of
the energy development. An externality occurs "whenever an output of one economic
agent appears as an imput in the consumption or production vector of another without
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of these highly variable land resource values caused by the
development. This relativity consequently depends on the location of the site in relation to the other land values; therefore,
the optimization analysis is focused on the alternative sites for
any development.
The externalities caused by energy development which are
a concern in the siting methodology can be more definitively
characterized as what one economist defines as true pollution
as distinguished from congestion externalities." 6 The relative
degree to which these pollutant costs become true externalities
in the context of the public land welfare functions depends on
the relative destruction of the welfare values. Because the destructive or polluting production outputs of an energy development will be generally the same at any alternative site, the
difference between each site's spatial relationships to the land
characteristics with assigned welfare values will be the determining factors for identifying the most efficient site. In the
vernacular of traditional welfare economics, the problem is top
"properly evaluate a. . . land use policy which results in gains
to some individuals [public users] and losses to others
...
'"1
, The siting analysis is not the proper framework for
assessing the total costs and benefits of X amount of energy
development but is simply the framework for assessing the
relative costs and benefits of each alternative.
The prequalification siting methodology has two major
stages of decision analysis. The first stage is the feasibility zone
identification and the second is the alternative sites analysis
and identification of the most efficient site. This separation of
anlaysis into a two-step process is significantly different from
most siting methodologies recently developed. The first stage
analysis involved in defining and identifying economically and
physically feasible areas for energy development is distinctly
accompanying payment." Fisher & Krutilla, Managingthe Public Lands: Assignment
of Property Rights and Valuation of Resources, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY REsoURcEs 35, 45 (E. Haefele, ed. 1974).
156. Rothenberg, The Economics of Congestion and Pollution: An Integrated
View, 60 AM. ECON. REv. 2, 114 (1970). Rothenberg's definition is paraphrased as, "a
competing dissimilar use of the environment which alters the characteristics of the
environmental resources in a way that is in some sense destructive, and in which there
is an unidirectional flow of the costs associated with the resource exploitation." Fisher
& Krutilla, supra note 155 at 47.
157. Id. at 47.
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different from the analysis involved in the specific site selection. This macrolevel analysis uses only industrial location factors based on sometimes very crude assessments of resource
availability and regional distances between the resources and
the market or demand point. 58 At this point, the boundaries
of the zones represent only thresholds of feasiblity based on this
macrolevel analysis. There is no assessment of relative costs
over space in any refined fashion, nor, more importantly, are
there any offsite externality assessments made. The secondlevel analysis must then use these feasibility zones as the universe of alternative assessments and therein take into account
the externality-economic cost differentials based on site specific analysis. 59
Combining both levels of economic and physical feasibility
with the externalities into one integrated siting analysis makes
it impossible to array the relative economic costs against the
relative environmental costs for better informed decisionmaking. The relative economic desirability of a particular site
would then be indistinguishable from the relative environmental desirability of a site, thereby increasing the potential for
distortion of the results. Inserting such quantitative costs into
qualitative evaluations may very well cause the decisionmaker
to falsely presume the site identified to be the optimal site
regardless of public welfare considerations. This segregation in
no way implies a discounting or minimizing of the importance
of economic costs to the ultimate siting decision. However, it
does recognize the pitfalls and potential for confusion inherent
in mixing the two very different criteria.
Once a regional or cell suitability analysis has been completed, it is absolutely essential that the resulting identified
cells or zones are not presumed to be the relatively best or most
158. See, e.g., Preliminary Engineering Analysis and Discussion of Issues for the
Six Alternative IPP Power Plant Sites, prepared by the Intermountain Power Project,
Salt Lake City, Utah for presentation at the November 1, 1977 Meeting of the Utah
Interagency Task Force on Power Plant Siting. See also, INSTrrUTE OF GEOPHYSICS AND
PLANETARY PHYSICS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT Los ANGELES, CALIF. Study of Alternative Locations of Coal-Fired Electric GeneratingPlants to Supply Energy from Western Coal to the Department of Water Resources, (Draft Summary Chapter) (May 4,
1977). (Funded jointly by the Dept. of Water Resources and the California Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission, Contract No. 1357027, Orson
Anderson, Principal Investigator).
159. G.W. Webb, Factors Affecting the Location of Coal Burning Steam Electric
GeneratingPlants, 19 THE PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 173 (issue 4, 1967).
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efficient locations without further analysis. This macrolevel
analysis cannot identify the best specific site in these zones. 110
The use of a two-level screening process also has a very practical advantage over a "one shot" or single integrated approach.
With early macrolevel prescreening there is elimination of
those areas which have little or no potential for development
due to economic, physical, or institutional factors. This macrolevel screening can then be used by both the land management
agency and the potential applicants to "red flag" these areas,
minimizing the investment of large amounts of time and
money in such very unlikely areas.
The following is a step-by-step specification of how the
methodology procedures are to be implemented by any user of
the process. The methodology is divided into major steps which
are chronological stages of analysis. Under each major step are
the procedures to be used to develop the data for the major step
of the process.
Step 1: FeasibilityZone Identification
The aim of this step is to develop a relatively large scale
map or series of maps delineating the available or feasible areas
for the contemplated development. This step has three substeps. The first is a purely economic resource availability analysis followed by institutional macrolevel and absolute constraint analyses. The separation is necessary here to isolate the
relatively static constraints of physical resource characteristics
from the more variable institutional constraints. Therefore,
adjustments of modifications in the institutions can be incorporated into the analysis without reevaluating the physical
suitability zones.
Step 1.1: Identification of Primary Economic Constraints
The beginning point of this analysis must have some defined potential energy development to analyze. This development will have certain key economic constraints which are related to the relative location of water and coal (if a coal-fired
160. The thing that makes cell analysis possible is vagueness or
'macro-ness'. That is, a given cell characteristic (say, water availability)
is taken to be characteristic of any potential site within a cell ....
Cell
analysis has [only] the potential for gross screening to determine those
areas not suitable for specific facilities; beyond this, site specific analysis
is mandatory.

Eberhart & Eagles, Regional Energy Facility Siting, v3 n1
MENT J. 73-74 (1976).

COASTAL ZONE MANAGE-
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plant) vis-a-vis the demand center(s). In terms of importance,
water availability usually is the most critical.'' Other significant macrolevel constraints to use in this step are firm supplies
of high-quality coal for the life of the development and developed or feasible transportation systems both for the coal to
power plant delivery and power plant to demand center transmission. The actual procedure begins with an identification of
all general areas with a sufficient water supply to sustain the
energy development requirements.'
Next, the coal supplies must be inventoried for the study
region to identify coal supplies which are of sufficient amount
to satisfy the requirements of the potential energy development. Third, Step 1.1 surveys the existing transportation system for adequate roads or railroads to move the coal from its
source. Finally, the existing transmission system is inventoried
for capacity and potential relative to the known demand
points.
Step 1.2: Delineation of Macrolevel TransportationCosts and
Identification of Unconstrained FeasibilityZones
Once the basic resource supplies are identified, a generalized transportation limitation isopleth (or equal value line) is
constructed around each supply of coal and water. Overlaid on
this isopleth map is a similar transmission limitation isopleth
from the demand centers. Because the level of information is
rather crude at this point, the specificity of the isopleths should
be rough. The results will be a map delineating all feasible
zones for energy development of the size and type being analyzed. The economic sophistication of Step 1.2 is purposely
simple to avoid becoming too site-specific prior to the public
welfare analyses. The only information sought at this point is
the absolute geographical limitations on feasibility from an
economic point of view and not an economic location optimization. The policy presumption supporting this approach is that
the potential for minimizing the overall total public welfare
requires latitude for imposing a certain amount of economic
161. According to Deasy and Gruss in their locational study of the American
Electric Power System, 49 of the 55 power plants analyzed specified water availability
to be the most critical location factor. Deasy & Gruss, Factors Influencing Distribution of Steam Electric Generating Plants, 12 Tum PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 1 (issue
3, 1960).

162. See, e.g., U.S.
IMPACT SATEMENT cl

m

DEPARTMENT OF INTEIoR, KAIPAnowrrs FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

(Washington, D.C. 1976).
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costs on the development (up to the point of feasibility limitation if necessary). This policy presumption is further supported
by the fact that the ultimate liability for added economic costs
is the large population of electrical power consumers which can
be presumed to accept the congressional assignment of the
aforementioned welfare values for protection.
Step 1.3: Identification of A bosolute Institutional Constraints
in the UnconstrainedFeasibilityZones
Once the unconstrained feasibility zones are identified and
mapped, the macrolevel institutional constraints which are
mandatory (at that point in time of the analysis) are mapped.
These are only constraints which will (1) be reasonably certain
to remain in force for the development period of operation and
(2) allow for no variance or modification without either legislative or judicial action. Such constraints are either based on
land management jurisdiction prohibitions or imposition of
physical resource quality degradation limits or a combination
of both."' Step 1.3 analysis takes these and other absolute institutional constraints and delineates only those areas within
the Step 1.2 zones which would not be available for development as a result of these prohibitive constraints. Because of the
inability to technically specify precise "L" boundaries for
many of these constraints, these lines are only tentative at this
point in the analysis. Later adjustments can be made in situa163. An example of land management absolute prohibitions is the National Park's
general prohibition against the construction of large coal-fired power plants within the
park boundaries or allowing high voltage transmission lines unless specially authorized
by legislation. The Capital Reef National Park Enabling Act created the special right
to have a transmission corridor developed through the park as determined by the
National Park Service. 16 U.S.C. §273(d) (1971). The obvious example of a resource
quality protection prohibition is the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Standards
in the 1977 Clean Air Act which imposes an absolute threshold on the level of emissions
which can be emitted from an energy development. The Clean Air Act of 1977, 42
U.S.C. §7401 (1977). An example of a combination is the antidegradation policy of the
Clean Water Act for waters within National Parks, 33 U.S.C.A. §1251 (West Supp.
1978). The regulations state this antidegradation as follows:
Existing high quality waters which exceed those levels necessary to support propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife and recreation in and on
the water shall be maintained and protected unless the State chooses. ..
to allow lower water quality as a result of necessary and justifiable economic or social development. In no event, however, may degradation . ..
be allowed in high quality waters which constitute an outstanding National resource . . . and waters of exceptional recreational or ecological
significance.
40 C.F.R. §130.17(e)(2) (1977).
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tions requiring more precise site-specific refinement of the
boundary by such means as air quality site modeling or intensive on site resource evaluations and inventories. By first identifying the economically and physically feasible zones, the
amount of analysis and inventory work is greatly reduced by
focusing all further analysis only on these zones.
Another type of potential constraint is the state and
local land use policies which may prohibit certain development
activities. These are to be incorporated at this point if they do
in fact satisfy the two above conditions of (1) being reasonably
certain of remaining in force and (2) not allowing any variance
or modifications without legislative or judicial action.
The residual of Step 1.2 and Step 1.3 is the actual feasibility zone to be analyzed at a site-specific level in all the remaining steps. It is at this point in time that the BLM would nominate or prequalify these areas for further study as potential
energy development areas, being careful to note that these are
only study areas and not yet definitely acceptable sites. This
can be done either by use of the management decision process
of the planning process8 4 or in combination with the corridor
identification process.' 5 At this point, there has been no formal
decision made by the BLM absolutely prohibiting any applications for energy development outside these Step 1.3 feasibility
zones. However, the strong preference to so confine such applications will result from this nomination bias by the BLM. Such
a bias is definitely supportive of this study's aim to focus the
energy industry's planning into the more acceptable zones
early in the industry's planning, to minimize the investments
in sites outside the zones which have much greater potential for
resource use conflicts, and to minimize drawn out administrative and litigative haggling.
Step 2: Public Welfare Value Inventory
This step is focused entirely upon the transfer of the legislatively assigned welfare values contained in statutes and regulations to the particular land areas which contain them. The
analytical procedure begins with the physical land inventory of
the BLM planning process and builds upon this inventory the
welfare values which are derivative from certain land charac164. 43 U.S.C.A. §1712(e) (Supp. 1978).
165. Id. §1763.
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teristics defined in the inventories. A very important distinction between this methodology and other spatial impact assessment approaches is, analogous to the segregation in Step 1, a
definite segregation of the simple inventory of values from the
actual impact assessment (Step 3). This segregation is necessary due to the significant difference between the existence of
a land value and the resulting impact on such a value from an
energy development. The correlation between the amount of
any land value existing in an area and the amount of adverse
impact is not direct and is very low for many land values;
therefore, identifying the optimal site as simply the area with
the lowest relative level of value existence is very misleading.
The analysis of efficiency or site optimality must be based
on the site which causes the least relative cumulative adverse
impacts on these existing values (i.e., pollution externalities as
defined by Rothenberg)."6 This can be determined only by analyzing the net change in the total welfare land values resulting
from adverse development externalities (i.e., pollution). The
net change on these land values is dependent upon two factors:
(1) the relative sensitivity of the value to the outputs or physical changes caused by the development, and (2) the relative
distance between the value and the development. Symbolically, this can be represented as follows: VIB represents the
relative amount of value 1 on X parcel of land in the feasilibity
zone before any development at Y, then VIA represents the
resulting level of that initial amount of value 1 after the development. If VIA< V1B, then there would be a degradation of
the value resulting from the development. This is then, by
the above definition, an externality. If VIA VIB, then there
has been no externality, even though the amount of the value
may be very high at that X location. The externality is then
XIB-VIA. VIB-VIA is a function of the above stated factors,
the relative impact sensitivity, and f(x). The distance between point X and point Y (the development site) represented
as f(dXY) where d is distance. The cumulative externality of
any site, Y= EVnB-VnA where E VnB-VnA = [f(x)f(dXY)]
VnB. f(x) is therein expressed in terms of relative reduction
of value and f(dXY) is expressed in terms of distance decay of
such sensitivities.
For example, suppose land parcel X has a high VIB. The
166. Rothenberg, supra note 156, at 114.
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relative sensitivity of this value to energy development is extreme within one mile of the site but is nonexistent at five miles
and the decay is linear. This case allows the distance decay
function to go from 1.00 at one mile or closer to 0.00 at five
miles with the linear point at any intermediate distance being
the f(x) function. The sensitivity function is simply a scalar
amount proportionate to the sensitivity in a none, low, or high
range because this methodology uses only the three scalar levels.
Step 2.1: Land Characteristics, Value Inventory, and
Identification
Step 2.1 involves use of the existing land resource inventories and any supplemental information which allows the land
planner to identify the existence and location of all land characteristics which have derivative land values. This can be done
in either of two ways, depending on the characteristic being
inventoried. One approach is to make a land grid dividing the
feasibility zone into convenient analytical cells. Then for each
cell, identify any such land characteristics which exist in the
cell. The other approach is to delineate the extent of the particular land characteristic within the zone by a boundary line. A
combination of both approaches is likely to be used depending
on the land characteristic being inventoried. For example, wetland areas containing wildlife values are fairly well known so
the delineation approach could be used. Scenic viewpoint values may be better identified by the grid system approach.
There is no relative value assignment in this step but only a
binary specification of either existence (+) or nonexistence (0)
of the value.
If there is any portion of a grid cell having any such characteristic it will be assigned a +. This presumes a theoretically
homogeneous grid at this point, but is not oversimplification
because the relative level of such value's existence will be determined in Step 2.2. Up to this point, the evaluation of
land resources has been oriented to the physical or biological
character of the land. This allows for truly ecological systems
analysis prior to the infusion of the political and economic
balancing into the methodology enabling the scientist in the
field to make the essential ecological inventories relatively unfettered by political constraints.
The philosophy of using the ecological system as the basis
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for planning has had strong supporters in recent years.'6 7 There
is, however, in Step 2.1 integration of the institutional factors
by identifying those land characteristics which express the values specified in the legislation, these values being derivatives
of these certain characteristics. Because of the focus primarily
on these institutionally important values rather than the ecologically important factors, this methodology is not what the
theorists would call a pure "ecological systems" approach.'"
This shortcoming, as the systems theorist would claim, is a
necessity in the context of the siting model being aimed at
implementation rather than theoretical purity. The siting process developed here includes only procedures that can be legally defended if challenged, or conversely, legally imposed if
not self-initiated by the agency. This condition constrains the
methodology to the use of only institutionally recognized values in the evaluation, however unecological this may seem.
Step 2.2: Relative Value Assignments
This is perhaps the most critical element in the methodology in that it contains the highest degree of deference to the
expertise of the agency for value assignments. It is in Step 2.2
that there is the highest potential for professional (or political)
bias, insufficient data, or poor correlation analysis between the
land (ecological) characteristic and the institutional value.
This methodology recognizes these potential problems and, in
an attempt to minimize them, has reduced the range of relative
value assignments which can be given to any area in the grid
to only three-low, medium, or high. One hypothesis for such
a restricted range is that any evaluation of qualitative values
is by definition subjective; therefore, the size of the range allowed for assignment of value is directly related to the potential
for distortion or bias.
Another methodology characteristic which is aimed at
minimizing the above problems is the stress upon relativity of
analysis. This methodology makes no claim to assign any absolute value to any element of the process, including the sites
themselves. Finally, the dispersion of the values into indivi167. See McHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969). See also WUENSCHER & STARRETT, LANDSCAPE COMPARTMENTALIZATION:

AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO LAND USE

PLANNING (1973).

168. For the first comprehensive statement of this approach, see ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY (2d ed. 1971).
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dual cells for site-specific assessment and value assignment to
be later cumulated helps to reduce the tendency to generalize
a value's relative ranking over the total extent of its existence
in the feasibility zone. Such a generalization without the grid
cell analysis may distort the outcome by presuming the value's
relative intensity to be homogeneous over the total extent of its
range. Such homogeneity of land values is very rare indeed.
The actual procedure of this substep is as follows: Each
positive (+) cell identified in Step 2.1 is evaluated for each
value contained in the cell and assigned either a low, medium,
or high intensity. Guidelines and specific criteria for each value
will be developed and applied uniformly for all positive cells in
the feasibility zone. The important condition here is uniformity of application with whatever criteria developed. The cell
evaluation must be focused on the values specifically expressed
in that particular cell's land characteristics and deemphasize
the surrounding cell values. The idea here is to segregate the
evaluation and minimize the subjectivity as much as possible
by concentrating on the small areas individually.
Because this is a relativity evaluation, the universe of values must be specified in order to define the limits of comparison. The relative value is a direct function, in most cases, of
the size of the universe considered, due primarily to the fact
that the relative value is usually related to the relative scarcity
of like resources available to the consumer. This relationship
is especially valid when the resource's value is dependent in
some degree upon the factor of uniqueness or the existence of
extraordinary features.6 9 In order to correlate the value assignment to the legal rationale or framework supporting the siting
process, the universe chosen should correspond as closely as
possible to the management universe of the decisionmaking
entity using the process.
Step 2.3: Extraordinaryor Special Value Assignment
This step is intended to allow the analyst to adjust the
Step 2.2 value assignments because of unique or special conditions which exist and to relate the value more closely to relative
169. An excellent example of this is the variation in relative value assignment of
flatwater recreation. If the universe specified includes many existing large reservoirs
with extensive recreational values, the relative intensity of this value at the margin
will be significantly less than if the universe has few such reservoirs. KRurtLA &
FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 39-59 (1975).
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demand for the value by the interested public. The principal
special or modifying conditions to be applied here include irreversibility of the value loss and minimal intervalue substitutability between the value lost and another replacement value
(stream fishing replaced by lake fishing as opposed to a unique
stream value not being replaceable by another such value).' 70
The basic rationale for including minimal substitutability is
similar to the irreversibility theory. The substitutability assessment is based on the amount of other replacement options
to approximately satisfy the same demands where the irreversability assessment may or may not be based on the ability to
substitute other values.
Another special modifying condition is relative accessibility to the value. This modifier is strictly limited to those values
which require accessibility as a part of their manifestation as
a value. Where such physical access is not a part or is only a
portion of the prerequisite conditions for enjoying the value,
then it should not be applied, or should be discounted accordingly. In other words, the rationale for applying such a condition to the evaluation is the recognition that certain values
require access to gain any utility or welfare value from them.
Access here is defined as the ability to utilize or gain satisfaction of the land value using whatever particular combination of senses required to do so and does not necessarily require
physical proximity. With such a definition as guidance, it must
be first determined what senses are required to utilize each
value, and secondly, whether physical access to that land area
170. There is ample economic theoretical support for giving extraordinary consideration to these conditions, although admittedly controversial. Krutilla and Fisher
succinctly summarize the argument for such special consideration:
If a destructive use of environmental resources involves a welfare loss in
perpetuity, irrespective of its implications for the more basic constituents
of human welfare, a case has been made for giving different weights or
priority to the rights based on the constructive-destruction dismotion
made in the use of the environment.
Krutilla & Fisher, Managing the Public Lands, in GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY
REsouRcEs, supra note 153, at 54. See also, Fisher, Krutilla & Cicchetti, The Economics of Environmental Preservation, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 605 (1972); Mishan, The
Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. OF EcoN.
LIT. 1 (1971). This theory is based on the following basic assumption for public
resources wherein the costs are total social costs. "[When] a destructive use of common property resources has an irreversible effect or is remediable only at great cost or
difficulty, there is some value [added] to keeping the option that would be foreclosed
by the destructive alternative." Id.
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is a prerequisite to such utilization. In some cases, lack of access is required or at least positively enhances the particular
value; for example, wilderness or watershed protection where
there is too much access actually degrades the value.
These Step 2.3 special value assignments can either modify the existing Step 2.2 value assignment or be specially
noted as additional elements of the value assignment. Because
of the importance of such special conditions as irreversibility
and extreme scarcity (minimal substitutability), it is recommended that these be separately designated in this step while
accessibility should be an incorporated modifier of Step 2.2
assignments.
A separate map and statistical compilation of each value
is then done in order to allow later weighting and separate
consideration of each value. Caution must be exercised in the
use of such Step 2.3 maps and dates in order not to misconstrue
what is represented by them. This step has only identified the
inherent values and not the potential impacts upon these values from an energy development. Many environmental assessments are guilty of allowing this faulty presumption of a direct
correlation between the existence or level of a land resource
value and the potential adverse impacts upon them. The analysis must focus on the impact which, as stated above, is not
dependent only on the relative value level but more importantly on both distance from the development and relative sensitivity of the value to the various outputs of the development.
Step 3: Relative Impact Assessment
Prior to beginning Step 3, there should be initiated by a
multisite right-of-way application an identification of the best
sites from an applicant's perspective within the feasibility
zone. These sites are first ranked according to their relative
desirability to the applicants and evaluated simply from engineering and economic criteria, exclusive of the public welfare
factors. This identification would most likely be done by potential applicants who desire to have their own locational criteria
used. In terms of integrating the siting process into the BLM
comprehensive planning system, completion of all the steps up
to Step 3 would suffice as a framework for nominating areas.
No further analysis by the BLM will be required until applicants come forward with site-specific proposals which would
trigger Step 3. Such a suspension of the siting analysis is
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essential because of the variable factors of time, technology,
and economics. This would be useful also because of the minimizing of unnecessary detailed analysis. By identifying the feasibility zones and precluding other infeasible areas, the goal of
agency assertion of the public interest value protection prior to
applications will be achieved if Steps 1 and 2 are already completed. This also allows the applicants time to adjust to and
analyze the nominations within their planning system. In addition, and perhaps most important, there will be much less uncertainty among the applicant industries about the "licensability" of their developments if they stay within the feasibility
zones.
In order to allow for consideration of all reasonable alternatives, it may be necessary for the BLM by rulemaking to
require applicants to identify all specific sites they would be
willing to consider within the feasibility zone. If only one site
is selected by an applicant, the agency is still obligated to
consider all reasonable alternatives. Therefore, applicants take
a very significant risk if only one site is acceptable to them.
Once the applicant has specified proposed sites, the relative
impact analysis can begin. This is also the most logical point
to begin the formal Environmental Impact Statement for the
specific developments.'7
Step 3.1: Impact Sensitivity and Distance Functions Analysis
The analysis is done for each value identified in the zone
on a cell by cell level to again avoid oversimplification of total
areas analysis and to take into account the differentials of each
land cell and the value development distance factors. For each
cell where a value exists, the relative impact sensitivity is specified for each output from the development. This measure is
again restricted to a range of none, low, medium, or high. (An
optional more restrictive range can be used which includes
none, minimal and significant sensitivity.) The determination
of this sensitivity index then incorporates the distance decay
function of each impact sensitivity where applicable.7'
171. There would also be a programmatic Environmental Statement prepared
prior to this stage on the overall feasibility zone nomination process similar to the
national wilderness studies being conducted by the U.S. Forest Service under the
rubric RAREII.
172. This inclusion of distance decay is critical to making this methodology
more representative of the real impacts than other siting models without such a function. Such models do not take into account offsite impacts because of the built-in
presumption that use compatibility of the value is only affected by onsite use conflicts.
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The relative impact assessment is then made for each
value in each cell for each alternative site being analyzed. Symbolically, X 1 , X 2 . . .Xn represent the particular land cells
being evaluated and Y 1 , Y 2 . . .Yn represent the alternative
sites being considered. V 1 , V2 . . .Vn represent the various
resource values being considered. Xn, Yn and Vn are all static
throughout the analysis in this Step 3.1, meaning they do not
vary except as modified by the following functions. Xn and Yn
are points which are set and Vn simply denotes the existence
of a value at point Xn. The modifying functions are represented as follows:
fSn

impact sensitivity index for n output.
fdn - distance decay of impact sensitivity for n output.
fi= relative intensity of value existing in cell n where the
range of fSn = none, low, medium or high and
the range of fi= low, medium or high.

Using these functions, the relative impact of the development from production, output I, at site Y 1 for value V1 at cell
X is: I = fi(Vlx)fdi fsl (dX, Y).
Step 3.2: Cumulative Impact Assessment
The cumulative impact of I1 on V1 then is simply the
total of the impacts on all cells Xn containing V1 or efi(Vlxn)
fdl fsl (Xn to Y1 distance). Similarly, the total relative impact of development at site Y1 = 6 ln where n = all potential
adverse impacts. At this point, any special or extraordinary
factors identified in Step 2.3 (irreversibility or minimal substitutability) should be added to the impact analysis for each
applicable impact. This addition should be a specially designated job of the decision maker wherein the factor's significance will not be discounted by aggregation into the overall
cumulation equation.
Step 4: Value Weighting Options
This step must be viewed as optional and is segregated to
clearly identify the highly discretionary process of weighting
Such a presumption does not allow for the more realistic evaluation of offsite impacts
as a function of distance. In energy development, the outputs causing such impacts
are often highly mobile or offsite in nature (e.g., air emissions, up-stream water discharges or diversions). This characteristic of development externalities requiresthe use
of offsite distance decay analysis in order to adequately present the total potential
impacts of development. McHARG, DESIGN WriT NATURE 143-45 (1969), where he uses
the phrase, "degree of compatability" to denote this index.
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from the more structured and systematic value assessments in
Steps 1 through 3. These weightings are also distinguishable
from the Step 2.3 factors because these options are focused
more on special political or social influences while Step 2.3 is
derived from and dependent upon the land characteristic itself.
Any combination of these options can be applied to any
combination of values or locations; therefore, the potential
number of permutations is extremely high giving great flexibility to the methodology. This high degree of flexibility, however,
creates perhaps an undesirable degree of administrative discretion. Therefore, the use of Step 4 must carry a prerequisite of
very extensive documentation and supporting evidence. From
a legal perspective, the burden of proof should be upon the
agency to justify the use of these options rather than upon the
critic in challenging the use. Their use should be viewed as
extraordinary and justified only where special conditions exist.
Option 1
The relative values developed in Step 2 can be increased
or decreased if there is significant public support for such a
particular value modification. The public support must, however, be representative of the total public interest in that particular value. Use of Delphi or survey methods are possible
means of developing such information as well as the review and
hearing comments in the EIS process for the alternatives and
the prior feasibility zone programmatic EIS. Special care must
be exercised to insure true representation of such special public
concerns.
Option 2
This option is labeled the land use policy compatability
index. This is in response to the growing demand for better
coordination between governmental planning entities, especially between the federal and state or local levels. There are
also regulatory mandates for such coordination in both the
74
NEPA7 3 and the FLPMA.
173. Where a conflict [between the proposed action and local land
policy] or inconsistency exists, the statement should describe the extent
to which the agency has reconciled its proposed action with the plan,
policy or control, and the reasons why the agency has decided to proceed
notwithstanding the absence of full reconciliation.
See Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements: Guidelines, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.8(2) (1977).
174. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1712(c)(9) (Supp. 1978) requires extensive compatibility of
the BLM activities with local and state land use policies.
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If there are local land use policies which emphasize one or
more values for preservation or enhancement, these policies
can be reflected in a positive weighting of that value in Step 2.
This weighting is represented mathematically by modifying
the fi function in Step 3.1 accordingly (e.g., from low to
high). In certain special cases, the value may be negatively
weighted if the land use policies clearly indicate a discounting
of such value; however, these discounting weightings can only
occur when they are not in conflict with national policy. 7 5 For
example, in no case can a negative weighting be justified or
allowed for a value having national significance such as a wilderness ,or a wild and scenic river.
Option 3
If the value has a very short recovery time from impacts,
a discounting of the value may be exercised. If conversely, the
recovery time of a value from such impacts is extremely long
term (but not irreversible), there can be an added weighting.
This weighting is applied to the impact sensitivity function,
fsn , in Step 3 accordingly. The rationale for such a weighting
is based on the theoretical presumption of a direct correlation
between potential opportunity costs to time of value lost.
Step 5: Alternative Site Comparisons
Once the cumulation of all net impacts has been done plus
the applicable weightings for each alternative site, Step 5 becomes the interface of information and decisionmaking. Be-.
cause this is a critical transition from the insulated world of'
professional analysis to the very exposed world of decisionmaking, this step must be very structured in its presentation format
to insure that there is a minimum of misunderstanding and/or
misuse of the information developed. It is also at this stage of
the siting process where the framework of tradeoffs between
economic development costs and public welfare values must be
clearly illustrated to the decisionmakers responsible for such
balancing.
Step 5.1: Lease Cost Tradeoff Analysis
Each alternative site Yn is assigned both its current con175. "Land use pians of the Secretary ... shall be consistent with State and local
plans to the maximum extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes
of this Act." Id.
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struction and operational economic costs for development.

This is to be broken down into components of the project (e.g.,
transmission system, water system). The quantifications of
these costs are only those added to the least cost alternative
for each component and total costs. Therefore, the least total
cost alternative is Kepresented by tT and the least component
cost likewise is EJC . The relatively greater costs or additive
costs are arrayed according to their level of departure from the
least cost figures. Similarly, the least cost public welfare site
(i.e., most optimal environmentally) is assigned both a least
total cost (ET) and a least component cost (19C). All other
alternatives are then arrayed according to their additive impacts above the optimal site and for each component.
A comprehensive arraying of all values and all component
costs for all sites will give the decisionmaker (and the reviewers
of the decisions) a clear and focused identification of the
tradeoffs involved in any siting choice. It also makes possible
component adjustments or mitigations to make certain sites
more attractive to a decisionmaker by being less polluting to a
certain critical value.
CONCLUSION

Siting of energy development in environmentally sensitive
areas is unavoidably a complex problem. Presenting an overly
simplistic solution of generalized platitudes such as the need
for balancing or one-stop licensing without a substantive discussion of the actual process is no solution at all. This relatively
detailed (although summarized) presentation hopefully does
substantively identify a way which is now legally justified and
technically practical for achieving that elusive balancing of our
own society's dichotomous and idealistic desires for both more
energy and preservation of our environmental quality.
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